TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/121889/12188900.046

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 7.5 KB | 161 lines

                                                                                INTERVIEW, Page  10

Vindication Of a Hard-Liner


Long the prophet of Communism's doom, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
foresees the end of the U.S.S.R. in its present form

By Strobe Talbott and Robert T. Zintl

    Q. You've always been a strong critic of the Soviets, yet
just in the past month you have been given a standing ovation
at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, you've been respectfully
interviewed in Pravda and even given prime-time coverage on
Soviet television. What has it been like for you personally?

    A. Well, I wouldn't be human if I didn't confess to a
certain amount of ego gratification. When I stood in front of
the foreign policy establishment in the Soviet Union and was
given a generally empathetic reception, I had a sense of, if you
will, historical vindication. But I also had a sense of
something much more important. There was a breakthrough taking
place in the thinking of people who for 70 years were
artificially divorced from the intellectual and philosophical
currents of the Western world. They are now in the process of
restoring some of those connections, of rejoining that process.
They are much more willing to be self-critical and to listen to
criticism. They appreciate the degree to which the Soviet Union
has fallen out of step with global development, and that has
driven them in the direction of seeking far-reaching changes.

    The last two years of this decade could be the Spring of
Nations in Central Europe. I am deliberately drawing the
analogy to 1848, which was called the Spring of Nations because
Central European nations rose against authoritarianism.

    Q. Given the violent aftermath of 1848, that's not a very
happy precedent.

    A. No, it isn't. But if things in Central Europe or the
Soviet Union go wrong, which they could, I don't think we'll see
a return to an assertive, confident, Stalinist renewal. Instead,
we'll probably see a turn toward some highly nationalistic form
of dictatorship, perhaps what I call a "Holy Alliance" between
the Soviet Army and the Russian Orthodox Church, galvanized by
a sense of desperate Great Russian nationalism. That would then
produce even more intense reactions from non-Russians. It could
be a very ugly picture.

    Q. What's the worst case you can imagine?

    A. I can imagine a Soviet intervention in East Germany,
where the Soviets have a lot of troops on the ground and
therefore on the spot. If the East German Communist regime were
to collapse through violence and if the Soviets were to remain
passive, then the whole thing would collapse, in Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets know that if they let go of East
Germany, Poland is lost.

    That's why it is so urgent for us, the West, collectively,
to give this turbulence a chance to work itself out
constructively in the direction of some form of pluralist
democracy. So far, we have not responded in a manner that does
justice to the magnitude of the opportunity, or, alas, to the
magnitude of the threat inherent in these truly earthquake-like
political phenomena.

    Q. What should we be doing?

    A. First, we need to discuss with all the parties concerned
the implications of change in Central Europe, and also of change
in Germany, because the two are related. We cannot end the
division of Europe without also, in some fashion, ending the
division of Germany. We are past the day when the future of
Europe could be shaped either by us or by the Soviets alone, or
even by us with the West Europeans. We now need to talk in equal
depth with the Russians, with our allies, the West Europeans,
and with our friends, the Central Europeans.

    Q. Are you using the term "Central Europeans"
interchangeably with what we would call "East Europeans"?

    A. I'm using it now instead of "East Europeans." East
Europe was the geopolitical designation for a reality that is
now disappearing.

    The military confrontation in the heart of Europe is
waning, so there should be significant cuts in our defense
budget. Security should be based on some new relationship
between the two alliances, rather than a dissolution of the two
alliances. Perhaps there could be a long-term arrangement for
a transitional NATO and Warsaw Pact presence in the respective
parts of a reconfederated Germany, so that there is no
insecurity bred.

    Suppose we save $20 billion to $30 billion in defense
spending on Europe in the next few years. Let's dedicate a third
or a fourth of that to a Central European Recovery Fund. If we
make a substantial contribution, I think the Europeans will more
than match it, and we can bring the Japanese into it.

    Q. When Gorbachev persuades the elite to go along with his
policies, where is the upside? What have they gained?

    A. Only a respite from the strains of the competition as
well as an opportunity to address their internal problems and
modernize their system. That is what Gorbachev and the people
around him are hoping to accomplish.

    At the same time, I left the Soviet Union with a sense of
deep foreboding. We're getting to a point where Gorbachev and
his colleagues will have to make some fundamental choices, all
of them very difficult and all of them pregnant with dangers.
He will either have to accelerate perestroika, really pushing
it forward in the direction of pluralism and the free market,
or he will have to engage in severe repression of the
non-Russians.

    Q. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs you say that the
U.S.S.R. is becoming a "volcano" and a "battleground" of
warring nationalities. Will there even be a U.S.S.R. in the year
2001?

    A. No. There will have to be something very different. The
pace of change, the scale of change, and the drama of the change
are all such that we have to stop thinking in conventional
terms. Perhaps there will be a Soviet confederation of some
sort, much looser than what there is now, with some new form of
associated statehood for the Baltic republics. Georgia and some
of the other more nationally defined republics could enjoy a
much more independent status within the Soviet confederation.
If they don't have that, then they will have to have some form
of Great Russian nationalist dictatorship. I think Gorbachev is
trying to persuade the non-Russian nations that they have to
accept some form of yet undefined pluralism as the only
alternative.

    Q. Does Gorbachev know what he is doing? Does he have a
clear plan?

    A. I think his speeches reflect a thoughtful man, who
really realizes that the ideological oversimplifications of the
past several decades are irrelevant. The hours I spent with some
of his people increased my feeling that they are intelligently,
thoughtfully, and in some ways boldly responding to the
short-term problems that they are confronting and which they
have the intellectual acumen to identify and not to evade. But
I am less certain now that they have any comprehensive,
long-range vision.

    Q. How about the Bush Administration? Does it have a
comprehensive, long-range vision?

    A. Well, in the late 1940s President Truman had around him
a cluster of creative people who asked themselves how the West
should respond to the collapse of Germany. Now is the time to
ask ourselves, creatively and historically, how do we respond
to the apparent collapse of the Soviet Union? We can either
deliberately shape a new world or simply let the old
disintegrate -- with some of the wreckage potentially even
endangering us.